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Financial education and asset allocation 
Steven D. Dolvin, C.P.A., William K. Templeton* 
College of Business Administration, Butler University, Indianapolis, IN 46208, USA 
Abstract 
We conduct a clinical study on a firm that restructures its 401(k) plan and simultaneously· offers 
financial education seminars to its employees. The restructuring requires each employee to restate 
allocation percentages, thus we are able to analyze the specific benefits of retirement planning 
seminars on the asset allocation decision. We find that seminar attendance is associated with increased 
portfolio diversification and improved risk management. When combined with changes in return, the 
overall result is that seminar attendees create more efficient portfolios, which implies a better 
understanding of the retirement planning process. © 2006 Academy of Financial Services. All rights 
reserved. 
Jei classification: A29; GIl; G20 
Keywords: Asset allocation; Retirement planning; 401(k) plan; Financial education 
1. Introduction 
The trend in corporate retirement plans in recent years has been to transition from defined 
benefit (i.e., pension) to defined contribution [Le., 401(k)] plans. This change shifts the 
responsibility of retirement planning from the firm to its employees and presents a number 
of investment alternatives for plan participants to choose from in building a retirement 
portfolio. To avoid potentially serious mistakes, employees must become educated as to the 
proper methods and criteria to employ when managing their retirement portfolios. 
Initially, most of this financial education was the responsibility of individual plan partic-
ipants. More recently, firms have begun offering in-house education, either by internal staff 
or external consultants, which participants often view as a form of employee benefit. If 
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individual participants are to have investment decision making responsibility, it is also 
important from a fiduciary perspective for employers to offer effective education programs 
that improve participants' ability to make sound asset allocation decisions. Thus, good 
financial education may be just as important to the firm as it is to the individual employee. 
These trends motivate us to examine the effectiveness of a particular employer sponsored 
financial education program in meeting the needs of both its participants and the employer. 
Existing studies examine various employer-sponsored plans, giving particular attention to the 
benefits that financial education provides. For example, many studies find that participants 
are too conservative in their allocation decisions. These studies also find that employees who 
attend investment education seminars are more likely to increase the proportion of equity 
they hold, thereby offsetting the conservative bent. 
Our study differs in significant ways from existing research. Prior studies generally 
concentrate on surveyed intentions (Muller, 2003; Clark, d' Ambrosio, McDermed & Sawant, 
2003), whereas we measure the impact of a retirement planning seminar on the actual asset 
allocations of attendees. Previous studies primarily analyze cross sectional data on allocation 
decisions of individuals who have attended a seminar (employer or non-employer-sponsored) 
relative to those who have not. We concentrate on participants within the same firm who did 
(or did not) attend the employer sponsored education seminar. 
The advantage of our clinical study is that we use actual asset allocation elections 
collected and reported by an employer at a single point in time rather than survey data on 
what participants intend to do or eventually do in a multimonth period after the education. 
In addition, by focusing on just one firm and its investment alternatives we are able to 
provide more insightful results on the potential impact of financial education on asset 
allocation decisions. For example, we are able to calculate Sharpe ratios on the pre- and 
post-seminar asset allocations to determine if participants who attend the planning seminar 
achieve more efficient portfolio diversification. Moreover, the firm we study presents a 
unique situation in that at the time of the education program, the structure of its 401(k) plan 
was in transition, which forced all employees to restate their allocation elections. This allows 
us to highlight more formally the actual impact of education programs on asset allocation 
decisions. 
We find that the education program provided by the firm we study appears to improve 
the financial understanding of its employees. More specifically, we find that participants 
who attend the seminar select a greater number of funds to hold, thereby increasing the 
diversification of their portfolios, which is consistent with the results of previous studies. 
In contrast to previous results, we find that employees who attend the seminars become 
more conservative in their allocation decisions. This result appears to be a function of 
firm specific characteristics. The original investment choices in the firm's plan were 
skewed toward small- and midcap equities. Thus, participants may have unknowingly 
constructed extremely risky portfolios. Our results are consistent with previous studies 
that find education induces participants to allocate in a way that is more consistent with 
their risk tolerance. 
In conjunction with reduced risk, we also find that portfolios of participants who attend the 
seminar do not have lower expected returns. The combination of lower risk, but otherwise 
equivalent returns, implies that participants who receive financial education are able to create 
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more efficient portfolios. Consistent with this implication, we find that the portfolios of 
attendees generally exhibit higher Sharpe ratios. In sum and consistent with previous studies, 
our results suggest that individual employees may not generally be knowledgeable enough 
to structure the most appropriate retirement portfolios. Employers may be able to offset this 
lack of knowledge, and also fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities, by providing education 
programs. 
In Section 2, we provide pertinent background on the recent transition to 401(k) plans, 
as well as the preparedness of employees and employers to deal with these changes. We 
also address the role of education in overcoming biases and improving portfolio man-
agement. In Section 3, we describe our data, giving particular attention to the specifics 
associated with the firm we study. Section 4 presents our results, including a series of 
robustness tests designed to increase confidence in our findings. In Section 5, we discuss 
implications for employees, employers, and education providers before summarizing 
conclusions in Section 6. 
2. Background 
2.1. History and transition of 401(k) plans 
The legislation that created 401(k) retirement plans in the United States passed in 
1978 and, by 2002, there were over 430,000 such plans with over 47,000,000 participants 
(History of 401(k) plans, 2002). Before the establishment and subsequent rise in use of 
these defined contribution plans, employers retained much of the responsibility for 
meeting the retirement needs of their workers through defined benefit plans. Although 
the increased use of 401(k) plans generally provides employees with more flexibility, 
this transition also shifts the burden and responsibility for retirement investment strategy 
to individual workers. 
This trend does not appear to be confined to corporations in the United States. The 
movement toward defined contribution plans seems to be occurring in the governmental 
sector, as well as abroad. For example, as this study is written in early 2005, President 
Bush has begun urging Social Security reforms that include a self-directed investment 
component, and Governor Schwarzenegger in California is advocating a similar privat-
ization of part of the state's retirement system. Additionally, a number of other states 
either have optional private plans for employees or are considering them (Palmeri & 
Byrnes, 2005). 
Although at an earlier stage, this trend toward participant directed retirement plans is 
evident in the European Union as well. In 1998, the European Commission announced an 
initiative to promote defined contribution plans and individual retirement accounts that 
would have similar rules across Europe (Bell, 1998). An example is France's "Plan 
d'Epargne Retraite Collectif' (PERCO), which gives employees a choice of at least three 
investment alternatives and which may also serve as a model for a pan European plan 
(Mahmud,2004). 
At the same time that defined contribution plans are proliferating, plan sponsors are also 
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increasing the number of choices available to participants (Benartzi & Thaler, 2002). A few 
years ago participants might have been asked to allocate funds among a stock fund, a bond 
fund, and the money market. Today, these same participants may face the choice of a dozen 
or more funds, each representing a distinct asset category. 
2.2. Employee preparedness 
With increased responsibility and a growing number of choices, a very real concern is 
whether individual participants are prepared to manage their own accounts. For example, 
some observers doubt that the majority of individuals have sufficient knowledge to make the 
asset allocation decision in a way that is consistent with their risk tolerance and retirement 
income needs (Zuckerman, 2005). According to a survey conducted by Hewitt Associates 
LLC, employers tend to agree that their workers lack financial knowledge. The survey also 
indicates that, as a result, employers are increasingly offering education opportunities. 
Unfortunately, many employers still doubt the overall effectiveness of these programs 
(Crenshaw, 2005), particularly considering that many workers choose not to take advantage 
of this financial education. 
In a similar fashion, Bernheim (1998) concludes that most Americans lack the preparation 
to manage their personal finances and that their retirement choices are a reflection of this 
ignorance. Bernheim also finds that Americans typically do not use assistance from qualified 
financial advisors, and his view is supported by data from the Employee Benefit Research 
Institute (1997), which finds that half of 401(k) decision makers do not consult a financial 
professional and only 45% of these participants find information from their employers to be 
"very helpful." This lack of knowledge generally results in participants being too conser-
vative and allocating too small of a percentage of their portfolios to equity securities. 
Compounding the problems associated with financial ignorance is a series of potential 
behavioral biases typically exhibited by uneducated investors. For example, Baker and 
Nofsinger (2002) note that biases such as heuristic simplification, overconfidence, status quo 
bias, and attachment bias may affect investment decisions, thereby causing investors to do 
serious harm to their wealth. Baker and Nofsinger suggest a five-step process for avoiding 
and/or overcoming these biases. This process revolves around financial education that leads 
investors to identify objectives and constraints, as well as fosters an understanding of 
diversification and quantitative investment criteria. Thus, education not only serves to 
improve fundamental understanding, but it may also dissipate the effects of psychological 
and behavioral biases. 
2.3. Effects of employer sponsored education 
Although only a relatively small percentage of participants take advantage of financial 
education offered by their employers, it is ironic that those who do use employer sponsored 
programs generally find them to be practical and useful. For example, Bernheim and Garrett 
(2003) find that the mere availability of an employer sponsored education program appears 
to increase savings rates, particularly in 401(k) plans. 
Arnone (2004) analyzes the availability and quality of employer sponsored education 
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programs. He contends that the highest quality programs are those that are offered year round 
(during working hours) and that address both general, as well as individualized, retirement 
planning scenarios. Unfortunately, Arnone concludes that this description is apt for only a 
minority of the available programs and that most individuals are still making decisions 
without the benefit of expert guidance from their employers. 
McCarthy and Turner (2000) find that even cursory written educational materials supplied 
by employers are beneficial, resulting in participants reducing their conservatism bias and 
allocating a greater portion of their accounts to equities. In a similar fashion, Muller (2003) 
shows that education classes influence more risk averse individuals to increase their alloca-
tion to equities, particularly those individuals who are farthest from retirement. 
Similar to the results of the above studies, Clark et al. (2003) find that approximately 30% 
of participants who attend a seminar provided by TIAA-CREF intend to change their asset 
allocations. Ameriks (2001) finds that TIAA-CREF participants who take part in a guidance 
session, either by phone or in person, which includes a software driven asset allocation 
recommendation, are more likely to adjust their allocations. 
The overall evidence suggests that even the most basic education programs are beneficial 
and aid plan participants in structuring more appropriate portfolios. In addition, with the shift 
in responsibility, these education programs are increasingly being viewed as more than just 
an employee benefit. Rather, the education may be viewed as a way to fulfill the fiduciary 
responsibility of plan sponsors. Thus, education programs may meet the needs of both 
employers and employees. 
3. Data 
A sizable law firm (approximately 100 lawyers and 125 support staff) located in the 
Midwestern United States provided the opportunity to address the research question of how 
financial education impacts participant asset allocation decisions in a retirement portfolio. 
Early in 2004, the firm conducted a review of possible changes to the investment alternatives 
made available to its participants through its 401(k) plan. On advice from consultants, the 
firm decided to engage a different fund manager for many of the investment alternatives. 
Although the change involved adding funds in asset categories not specifically available in 
the existing set, funds representing most of the typical asset categories were available in both 
the existing and the prospective sets of investment alternatives. Appendix 1 provides a listing 
of the available fund investments both prior and subsequent to the change. 
With the change in fund provider, all participants were required to restate their asset 
allocations. Before this decision, the firm provided opportunities for participants and their 
spouses to attend a seminar on retirement investing. The seminar was presented four times 
during the first two weeks of June 2004 at a variety of hours to be convenient to as many 
participants as possible. The seminar, which was conducted by the same educator each time, 
lasted approximately 90 min and covered the main topics of planning fundamentals, the 
alternative investment funds and their risk-return characteristics, diversification, risk toler-
ance, and asset allocation strategies. Handout materials summarizing the presentation were 
also distributed. Approximately 60% of the eligible participants attended one of the seminars. 
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After the seminars, plan participants (both attendees and non-attendees) were surveyed by 
the employer to determine if they attended the seminar, as well as to collect control 
information on risk attitudes and demographics. Survey respondents provided the last four 
digits of their social security numbers so that survey data could be matched in an anonymous 
fashion to asset allocation data from both prior and subsequent to the education seminars. 
To estimate the overall risk and return profiles of retirement portfolios selected by plan 
participants, we collect five years of monthly historical return information on all funds 
available both prior and subsequent to the restructuring. We collect mutual fund data from 
Yahoo! Finance, Morningstar, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
databases. Data for the midcap blend and small-cap value funds come directly from the 
portfolio managers. In addition, we proxy risk free rates of return using the market rate on 
three-month Treasury bills for the specific month of interest. 
With survey and financial data collected as described above, we calculate the following 
variables for participant retirement accounts prior and subsequent to the plan restructuring: 
Funds = The number of funds held in the participant's portfolio; 
Equity = The percentage of the participant's portfolio that is invested in equity (i.e., 
non-fixed income instruments), as determined by Morningstar data on individual fund 
compositions; 
Return = The expected yearly return on the participant's portfolio, as estimated using five 
year historical return data; 
Dev = The standard deviation of the participant's portfolio, which accounts for the 
covariance of returns among the different investment choices; and 
Sharpe = The Sharpe ratio of the participant's portfolio, defined as the fund's expected 
return less the risk free rate, relative to the portfolio standard deviation. 
4. Methodology and results 
4.1. Univariate results 
It is possible that the change in plan structure would allow all employees to create more 
efficient portfolios. For example, the addition of REIT, High Yield Bond, and Balanced 
funds expands the opportunity sets participants face and, therefore, increases the ability to 
form efficient portfolios. It is also possible that there is an underlying relation between 
seminar attendance and prior portfolio choice. Thus, rather than focusing on a comparison of 
attendees versus non-attendees on either a pre-change or post-change basis, we concentrate 
on a comparison of the changes in each of the above variables. 
For example, rather than evaluating the variable Funds, both before and after the change, 
we define the variable FundsDiff as the difference in the number of funds held subsequent 
to the restructuring relative to the number of funds held prior. Thus, for a participant who 
held five funds before the change and seven funds after, the variable FundsDiff would take 
on a value of 2. Because both attendees and non-attendees face the same pre- and post-
choices, analyzing the change, rather than the individual values, allows us to specifically 
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Table I 



























Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the portfolios of two groups of participants: those who attend 
the seminar (that is, Attend) and those who do not attend the seminar (that is, NotAttend). The first two columns 
report mean values for each group, and the last column provides t-statistics from difference tests between the two 
groups. t-statistics that are italicized are significant at the 10% level. Each variable represents a differenced 
amount that compares values prior to the seminar to values after the seminar. For example, FundsDiff is the 
number of funds held after the seminar less the number of funds held before the seminar. Thus, a positive value 
indicates an increase in the number of funds held. Equity measures the percentage of the participant's portfolio 
invested in equity; Return measures the average historical return for the selected portfolio; Dev measures the 
standard deviation of the chosen portfolio; and Sharpe measures the reward to risk ratio of the selected portfolio, 
as measured by the risk premium, relative to standard deviation. 
focus on the influence of the financial education seminar and, at least in part, reduce the 
effects of the structural change in the plan's composition. It is worth noting that the number 
of funds available before the plan change is equivalent to the number offered subsequent to 
the change. 
Table 1 contains portfolio summary statistics for the differenced values of the variables 
described above. We report averages for those plan participants who attend the seminar and 
those who do not. In addition, we report t-statistics from difference of means tests between 
the reported values. We find that, on average, those who attend the seminar increase the 
number of funds they hold by 2.26 whereas those who do not attend increase by only 0.66. 
This difference is significant at the 1 % level and is consistent with increased diversification 
for those who receive financial education. 
While attendees hold more funds, the percentage invested in equity is actually reduced by 
- 3.66%; whereas, equity held by non-attendees increases by 5.13%. This difference is 
significant at the 10% level. This result is in contrast to prior studies (McCarthy & Turner, 
2000; Muller, 2003) that find financial education results in participants becoming more risk 
tolerant; however, it is consistent with the starting position of this plan. 
A unique characteristic of the firm we study is a long-standing relationship with the 
managers of both the midcap blend and small-cap value funds. (These are actually managed 
accounts rather than mutual funds.) At one time in the plan's history, these were the only 
equity fund alternatives. In addition, through multiple changes in the plan's structure, these 
managers have been retained. In fact, these were the only two funds for which the manager 
was not changed in the most recent restructuring. 
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) investigate diversification strategies in defined contribution 
plans and find that many investors follow a simple and naive strategy of dividing their 
contributions equally among all available investment alternatives. Thus, the previous struc-
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ture of the firm's plan, in which there were multiple equity choices (particularly more risky 
equity choices), suggests that participants in this plan may have had an aggressive bias, rather 
than a conservative bias as shown in previous studies. This aggressive bent may be even 
more pronounced because of the mid- and small-cap funds being the only equity choices 
available at one point in the plan's history. 
As a result of the long-standing relationships, the average starting position of most plan 
participants was likely very different from that of a typical 401(k) plan. Thus, the decrease 
in the portion of equity held in the portfolio may actually be more efficient, which would be 
consistent with the results of previous studies. This finding also highlights the critical 
fiduciary role of plan sponsors in providing appropriate investment alternatives. 
Although seminar attendees invest in more and different funds than their counterparts who 
do not attend, the difference in average returns on portfolios for the two groups is not 
significantly different. Attendees hold relatively less equity, but their expected returns do not 
decrease compared to non-attendees who are holding relatively more equity. Consistent with 
reduced equity holdings and increased diversification, portfolios held by seminar attendees 
are associated with a reduced standard deviation, particularly in comparison to non-attend-
ees, and this difference is significant at the 1 % level. Insignificant differences with regard to 
returns, but significantly reduced risk as measured by standard deviation, implies a more 
efficient portfolio. This is consistent with the difference in the Sharpe ratio being higher 
(significant at the 10% level) for seminar attendees. 
Some additional information may illustrate the differences even more clearly. Before the 
seminar, 24 of the seminar attendees had their entire allocation split evenly between the 
midcap blend and the small-cap value funds, which, as mentioned, are the traditional equity 
offerings of the firm. After the seminar, only four of these retained this allocation. Those who 
attended the seminar and made some change to their election percentages reduced the 
allocation to these two funds from 78 to 37% of their contributions. These simple statistics 
clearly illustrate both the influence of the set of alternatives the employer presents partici-
pants (i.e., perceived fiduciary responsibility) and the increased attention to diversification 
engendered by seminar attendance. These findings are also consistent with Waggle and 
Englis (2000) who find that two-thirds of IRA investors put all their holdings in a single asset 
class. Also consistent with our study, Waggle and Englis suggest that these portfolio choices 
illustrate a compelling need for financial education. 
To address the possibility that the differences between attendees and non-attendees found 
in Table 1 are related to factors other than seminar attendance (i.e., self-selection bias), we 
examine individual participant characteristics. For example, Lin and Lee (2004) find that age, 
education level, investment knowledge, and risk tolerance affect allocation decisions. More-
over, Boscaljon (2004) and Booth (2004) both find that time to retirement, rather than just 
age, is also important in determining allocations. 
After these studies, we examine a similar set of participant characteristics. For example, 
Retire is a binary variable equal to one if the participant plans to retire within the next five 
years. Age is the age of the participant, in years. Female is a binary variable equal to one if 
the participant is female, zero if male. Primary is a binary variable equal to one if the 
participant is the primary income earner in his or her household. 
Aggressive is a binary variable equal to one if the participant classifies hirnlherself as an 
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Table 2 
Participant summary characteristics 
Attend (1) Not Attend (3) t-statistics (1) v (2) 
N 43 29 
Retire .06 .15 -1.35 
Age 45.86 44.53 .62 
Female .70 .63 .74 
Primary .56 .70 -1.37 
Aggressive .22 .05 2.47 
ModAggressive .64 .63 .14 
ModConservative .14 .25 -1.29 
Conservative .00 .08 -1.78 
HS .16 .23 -.77 
College .26 .23 .38 
Bachelors .18 .10 1.10 
Graduate .40 .45 -.47 
Extreme .12 .13 -.07 
Some .62 .53 .90 
None .26 .35 -.91 
ExtSeminar .18 .28 -1.05 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for two groups of participants: those who attend the seminar (that 
is, Attend) and those who do not attend the seminar (that is, NotAttend). The first two columns report mean values 
for each group, and the last column provides t-statistics from difference tests between the two groups. t-statistics 
that are italicized are significant at the 10% level. Retire is a binary variable equal to one if the participant plans 
to retire within the next five years. Age is the age of the participant, in years. Female is a binary variable equal 
to one if the participant is female, zero if male. Primary is a binary variable equal to one if the participant is the 
primary income earner in hislher household. Aggressive is a binary variable equal to one if the participant 
classifies himlherself as an aggressive investor. ModAggressive, ModConservative, and Conservative are also 
self-described risk tolerance binary variables indicating moderately aggressive, moderately conservative, and 
conservative, respectively. HS, College, Bachelors, and Graduate are binary variables indicating an education 
level of high school, some college (that is, associates), bachelors degree, or graduate degree, respectively. 
Extreme, Some, and None are binary variables indicating a participant's self-described knowledge of investments. 
ExtSeminar is a binary variable equal to one if the participant previously attended an external retirement planning 
seminar in the last five years. 
aggressive investor. ModAggressive, ModConservative, and Conservative are also self-
described risk tolerance binary variables indicating moderately aggressive, moderately con-
servative, and conservative, respectively. Although these are self-assessed measures of risk 
tolerance, Hallahan, Faff, and McKenzie (2004) find that these self-assessments generally 
correspond with psychometrically derived financial risk tolerance scores. 
HS, College, Bachelors, and Graduate are binary variables indicating an education level 
of high school, some college, bachelors degree, or graduate degree, respectively. Extreme, 
Some, and None are binary variables indicating a participant's self-described knowledge of 
investments. ExtSeminar is a binary variable equal to one if the participant previously 
attended an external retirement planning seminar in the last five years. (The 2004 seminar 
was the first such seminar offered internally.) Similar to Table 1, we calculate means for 
attendees and non-attendees, as well as t-statistics from difference tests between these values, 
and we report these results in Table 2. 
In general, it appears that the characteristics of attendees and non-attendees are relatively 
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similar, which suggests that there is not a significant self-selection bias and that it is the 
education seminar that primarily drives the differences in portfolios that we observe. There 
is, however, one significant difference, Those who attend the seminar are more likely to be 
aggressive investors and less likely to be conservative. We should note, however, that those 
who attend the seminar complete a risk assessment as part of the experience. Thus, they may 
have a better basis from which to answer the survey item than those who do not attend. 
Presumably, non-attendees just make a completely subjective evaluation of their risk attitude. 
Thus, this difference may not be meaningful; however, we formally address possible 
endogeneity in a subsequent section. 
4.2. Multivariate results 
The lack of significant differences in Table 2 suggests that seminar attendance is the 
driving force behind the relations found in Table 1; however, to address these findings even 
further we conduct multivariate analyses that explicitly control for the underlying charac-
teristics of plan participants. We begin by estimating the parameters of the following model: 
Depj = a + f3 1Attend + f32Retire + f33Age + f34Female 
+ f3 sPrimary + f3~ggressive + f37ModAggressive 
+ f38ModConservative + f39Coliege + f3 IOBachelors 
+ f3 11 Graduate + f312Some + f313Extreme + f314ExtSeminar + Bj 
(1) 
where Dep is the dependent variable and is either FundsDiff, EquityDiff, ReturnDiff, DevDiff, 
or SharpeDijf. These dependent variables are defined above. Attend is a binary variable equal 
to one if the participant attends the education seminar, zero otherwise, and all other 
independent variables are as defined previously. We report the results of this analysis in 
Table 3. 
Controlling for individual participant characteristics, we find that seminar attendance 
remains significant in increasing the number of funds held. Also consistent with our earlier 
results, we find that individual participant characteristics are insignificantly related to the 
difference in the number of funds held prior and subsequent to the plan change. 
Examining the difference in the percentage of equity held, we find that seminar atten-
dance, consistent with our earlier univariate results, decreases the percentage of equity held. 
In fact, we find that the estimate of the reduction is -13.89%, which is more economically 
significant than our earlier results suggest (i.e., previously found a -3.66% reduction for 
attendees, or an -8.79% reduction relative to non-attendees). We also find that the control 
variables are generally insignificant. The only exception is education level, which suggests 
that those with undergraduate or graduate degrees generally increase the proportion of equity 
held. We address the potential relation between education and seminar attendance in 
robustness tests, which we report in a subsequent section. 
Seminar attendance is unrelated to differences in expected return, which is consistent with 
our earlier results. The only variables that appear to be significantly related to changes in 
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Table 3 
Regression results 
FundsDiff EquityDiff ReturnDiff DevDiff SharpeDiff 
Coef. (-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept .10 .04 -.97 -.04 -6.44 -1.25 -3.93 -.75 .19 .05 
Attend 1.50 2.37 -13.89 -2.29 -1.03 -.74 -3.15 -2.21 .42 1.39 
Retire -1.77 -1.37 -6.47 -.52 -.40 -.14 1.84 .63 .07 .03 
Age .01 .17 .46 1.51 .14 2.02 .08 1.18 -.01 -.14 
Female -.57 -.59 2.84 .31 .78 .37 1.28 .59 -.01 -.01 
Primary -.03 -.05 -7.93 -1.36 -1.46 -1.08 -.89 -.65 -.74 -.71 
Aggressive 1.36 .71 -1.01 -.06 -4.17 -.99 .82 .19 -.76 -.23 
ModAggressi ve 2.32 1.37 -20.49 -1.26 -3.39 -.91 -3.05 -.80 .24 .08 
ModConservative .42 .24 -13.01 -.77 -1.73 -.45 -1.34 -.34 -.46 -.15 
College -.58 -.75 12.20 1.64 3.19 1.86 3.14 1.79 1.18 .89 
Bachelors -1.36 -1.24 30.92 2.96 6.88 2.86 7.13 2.90 -.92 -.49 
Graduate -.45 -.35 23.18 1.89 3.13 1.11 4.76 1.65 -.95 -.43 
Some -.55 -.75 -8.48 -1.21 -.24 -.15 -3.38 -2.04 1.54 1.23 
Extreme -.74 -.62 -11.80 -1.03 .40 .15 -3.18 -1.18 1.91 .94 
ExtSeminar .01 .01 -7.65 -1.14 .49 .32 -.18 -.11 -.30 -.25 
n 72 72 72 72 72 
Adj R2 .1511 .0817 .0943 .1258 .0165 
Note: This table presents regression results from estimating the following model: 
Depi = a + f3/Attend + f32Retire + f3yAge + f34Female + f35Primary + f3t0ggressive + f37ModAggressive 
+ f38ModConservative + f39College + f3l(jJachelors + f3/1Graduate + f3/2Some + f3I3Extreme + 
f3J4ExtSeminar + ei 
where Dep is the dependent variable and is either FundsDiff, EquityDiff, ReturnDiff, DevDiff, and SharpeDijf. 
These dependent variables are defined in Table 1. Attend is a binary variable equal to one if the participant attends 
the education seminar, zero otherwise, and all other independent variables are defined in Table 2. t-statistics that 
are italicized are significant at the 10% level. 
expected return are participant age and education level, both of which appear to be positively 
related to differences in return. We also find that seminar attendance, consistent with our 
results above, is negatively related to changes in the average portfolio standard deviation. 
Again, education level is positively related to this difference, as is the level of previous 
investment experience. Given that seminar attendance reduces the average portfolio risk but 
has little effect on return, we would expect attendees to have a larger (positive) change in the 
efficiency of their portfolios. Consistent with this, we find that seminar attendance is 
positively related to the Sharpe ratio, although the coefficient is only significant at the 15% 
level, which may, however, be a reasonable significance given the relatively low number of 
observations. 
Our findings, both on a univariate and multivariate basis, indicate that seminar attendance 
aids participants in improving the structure of their portfolios. Given the importance of 
seminar attendance, two important questions follow. First, "Which participants are likely to 
attend the seminar?" Second, "Do the characteristics of these participants cause the changes 
we observe, or is it the education provided that precipitates the differences we find?" To 
address these issues, we conduct a logistic regression that identifies characteristics associated 
with an increased or decreased likelihood of attendance. Specifically, we estimate the 
coefficients of the following model: 
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Table 4 





















Percent Concordant 87.9 
Note: This table presents logistic regression results from estimating the following model: 
Attendj = a + f3 JFundsB + f32DevB + f33EquityB + f34Retire + f3y4ge + f36Female 
+ f37Primary + f3~ggressive + f3~odAggressive + f3f(JlModConservative 
+ f3/1College + f3J2Bachelors + f3J3Graduate + f3I4Some + f3J5Extreme 



















where Attend is a binary variable equal to one if the participant attends the education seminar, zero otherwise. 
FundsB is the number of funds held prior to the seminar; DevB is the participant's portfolio standard deviation 
prior to the seminar; and EquityB is the percentage of the preexisting portfolio that is invested in equities. All 
other independent variables are defined in Table 2. 
(2) 
+ f3sAge + f36Female + f37Primary + f3 sAggressive + f3 9ModAggressive 
+ f3\OModConservative + f3ttCollege + f3t2Bachelors + f3t3Graduate 
where FundsB is the number of funds held before the seminar; DevB is the participant's 
portfolio standard deviation before the seminar; and EquityB is the percentage of the 
preexisting portfolio that is invested in equities. All other variables are as defined previously. 
We report the results of the above logistic regression in Table 4. 
We find that participants with a higher portfolio standard deviation before the seminar are 
more likely to attend. Recall that many participants were heavily invested in the midcap 
blend and small-cap value funds because of those being the primary equity alternatives in the 
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plan for a number of years. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that these participants may 
have been naIve investors seeking to make a more informed asset allocation election. 
We find that neither perceived risk tolerance nor investment experience is significant in 
predicting attendance, which is in contrast to what we would expect. We do find, however, 
that those with undergraduate or graduate degrees are more likely to attend. Interestingly, 
although participants with only a high school education may benefit the most from the 
seminar (which we discuss in more detail in our robustness tests), they are not more likely 
to attend. 
Female and older participants are more likely to attend the seminar, although those who 
are closest to retirement (i.e., within five years) are not more likely to attend. These results 
are consistent with earlier studies that find females are more responsive to financial educa-
tion. Participants who have attended an external seminar are less likely to attend, as are those 
who are the primary income earner for their family. 
To address possible self-selection bias, we conduct a two-stage (i.e., simultaneous equa-
tion) analysis using regression Eqs. (1) and (2). Specifically, we use the logistic regression 
results in Table 4 to predict which employees will attend the seminar. We then use these 
predicted values, rather than the actual attendance variable, in the regressions in Table 3. If 
education is important, then we would expect significance levels on the predicted attendance 
variable similar to those we find on the actual attendance variable. We find results consistent 
with this notion. Specifically, the predicted attendance variable (which controls for attendee 
characteristics) is significantly related to the changes we find, giving us increased confidence 
in the importance of seminar attendance and the education it provides. We also note that even 
if there were a self-selection bias, it is very unlikely that the individuals would have made 
the changes we find without the direction provided by the seminars. Therefore, even if 
self-selection existed, it would not necessarily rule out the potential importance of financial 
education seminars. 
4.3. Robustness tests 
Recall that in Table 3, the only variable, other than seminar attendance, that is consistently 
related to portfolio characteristics is level of education. Lin and Lee (2004) and Hallahan, 
Faff and McKenzie (2004) find that education increases an individual's capacity to identify, 
evaluate, and incorporate relevant information. Moreover, they find that it is not the type of 
education that matters, but the level. Therefore, we repeat the analyses after including 
interaction variables between Attend and each of the education level binary variables, which 
accounts for the possibility that the seminar is more useful for individuals with a particular 
level of education. We find, however, that these interaction terms are generally insignificant. 
The one exception is that high school graduates (i.e., lowest education level) who attend the 
seminar tend to have a significantly greater number of holdings and reduced equity (and risk) 
positions compared to high school graduates who do not attend. Thus, seminars may be most 
beneficial for those with less formal education. This suggests that the education itself was 
clear enough for even the least educated to apply. Unfortunately, as found in Table 4, high 
school graduates are not more likely to attend the seminars. 
As a further robustness check, we examine interaction variables between attendance and 
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each of the other control variables. We find that these terms are generally insignificant, which 
lends additional support to our earlier results. Additionally, to address the possibility that 
survey respondents are qualitatively different from those who complete the survey, we 
conduct difference tests on portfolio composition before the plan change. (These data are 
provided by the firm for all employees, not just survey respondents.) We find no significant 
differences. In addition, rather than focusing purely on portfolios within the 401(k) plan, we 
examine possible changes in portfolio compositions outside the plan; however, we find no 
significant difference between the two groups of employees. Both of these findings suggest 
our results are robust. 
Rather than focusing on standard deviations and Sharpe ratios, we repeat our analysis 
using portfolio betas, which are calculated using five years of historical monthly returns, and 
Treynor ratios, which we define as portfolio return less the risk free rate relative to the 
portfolio beta. If investment alternatives exhibit sufficient levels of diversification, then we 
would expect similar results. Consistent with this expectation and our earlier results, we find 
that seminar attendees create portfolios with reduced betas and higher Treynor ratios. Thus, 
our results are robust to different definitions of portfolio risk. 
As a last test, we conduct the analyses after defining historical returns on 3- and lO-year 
bases, rather than using five years of historical data as in our primary analyses. We find that 
the results are qualitatively similar to those reported. Specifically, seminar attendance 
appears to reduce portfolio risk (Le., increased diversification and lower deviation), yet it 
does not decrease expected return. Thus, portfolios of those who attend generally appear to 
have improved efficiency relative to portfolios of participants who do not attend. 
5. Discussion 
The results of this study suggest that financial education aids employees in choosing more 
appropriate asset allocation percentages, as well as more efficient portfolios. These improve-
ments may result from a deeper understanding of the intricacies of financial management, as 
well as from a reduction in the psychological biases typically exhibited by unsophisticated 
investors. 
We recognize, however, that our results may not be completely representative of the broad 
market, particularly given the small sample size of this clinical study and the difference in 
historical structure (i.e., small-cap weighting) of the firm's 401(k) plan as compared to most 
other plans. However, the results are generally consistent with previous studies in highlight-
ing the critical importance of improving the financial education level and understanding of 
plan participants. 
In some ways, by offering participants this seminar, this employer was able to mitigate a 
situation it had unwittingly created several years ago. The two primary equity alternatives, 
a midcap blend fund and a small-cap value fund, have a history of excellent return 
performance. Nevertheless, these funds represent relatively risky choices in which to con-
centrate a large percentage of participant holdings. 
Consistent with previous studies, we find that many participants undertake a naIve 
strategy of evenly splitting contributions across investment alternatives. At the extreme, 
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we find that many plan participants did so when only the small and midcap funds were 
available, without any subsequent changes as the plan investment alternatives were 
altered (status quo bias). This simplistic approach created portfolios that were extremely 
risky, particularly in comparison to the apparent desires and risk tolerance of the 
investors. 
It is apparent, therefore, that employers influence asset allocation simply through the 
investment alternatives they offer, which is another indication of the fiduciary responsibility 
to which firms are subject. By expanding the choices available to participants and also by 
providing the education seminars, this employer appears to have significantly benefited its 
participants. We suggest that plan sponsors would be wise to ensure they are offering an 
appropriate set of investment funds and offer basic investment education to assist plan 
participants in making efficient asset allocation decisions. 
Our findings do not suggest that external, independent financial educators need to be used 
to present seminars. Consistent with previous studies, our results suggest that it is imperative 
that content follow a standard approach. Specifically, building on Baker and Nofsinger 
(2002), a seminar should, at a minimum, include the following: 1) identification of objectives 
and constraints (including time to retirement), 2) description of expected return and risk 
levels associated with various investment categories, and 3) explanation of ongoing review 
and reallocation. 
6. Conclusions 
It seems that the business news continues to contain regular announcements of another 
employer's shift from a traditional defined benefit retirement plan to a defined contribution 
plan. Management will continue to face the task of offering an appropriate set of investment 
alternatives for these plans. Perhaps just as importantly, they will increasingly feel pressure 
to provide their employees with financial education to better equip them to manage their 
individual retirement portfolios. 
In this clinical study, we address the potential benefits of financial education on retirement 
fund asset allocation. We find that the retirement education seminar sponsored by the 
employer we study has significant effects on the asset allocation decisions of 401(k) plan 
participants. Compared to participants who do not attend a seminar, those who attend appear 
to diversify into more funds and reduce the overall risk level of their retirement portfolios. 
Attendees do not appear to sacrifice portfolio return, which suggests that their portfolios are 
generally more efficient. These results imply that employers offering defined contribution 
plans should pay attention to the financial education needs of their employees. 
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Appendix 1 






Large cap index 
Extended index 
Large cap growth (2 funds) 
Dividend growth 
Mid cap blend* 






High yield bond 
Large cap index 
Mid cap blend* 
Small cap growth 
Small cap value* 
International 
Balanced debt and equity 
REIT 
Note: This appendix provides the set of funds available prior and subsequent to the change in plan structure. 
An * indicates funds that were retained in the plan. All others, even if in the same category, were replaced by a 
different fund. 
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